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The notion of cooperation is employed in different philosophical disciplines. Political 
philosophers have widely discussed the normative implications of social cooperation, 
while theorists in social ontology have investigated the preconditions of cooperation. In 
these works, the analysis turns around the questions of which intentional states 
participants are supposed to share, what it means to form a social group, what kind of 
common knowledge the co-operators should have, and so on and so forth (Paternotte 
2014; Tuomela 2000). Cooperation is also studied in other non-philosophical disciplines 
such as psychology, sociology, management studies, and so on. Despite the 
methodological and substantive differences, there is a widespread assumption regarding 
the individual entities that can cooperate. Whether they constitute small informal groups 
or societies, whether they are restricted to the national domain or to the global arena, 
parties to a cooperative scheme have implicitly been assumed to be human beings. This 
is because only human beings have the mental capacity to engage in a collective 
 
1 Research for this paper was funded by an Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Senior Fellowship at the 
University of Hamburg. A previous version of this paper was presented in a workshop at the University of 
Hamburg on Cooperation with Animals? I am grateful to the audience of the workshop (Svenja Ahlhaus, 
Gün Güley, Bernd Ladwig, Luise K. Müller, Peter Niesen, Markus Patberg, Philipp von Gall), and 
especially to Peter Niesen for many stimulating discussions about related topics and for prompting me to 
reflect on these issues.  
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enterprise.2 However, recently some have attempted to apply the idea of cooperation to 
(some) relations with animals. The purpose of this paper is to check whether such 
attempts make sense and more generally to examine what cooperation with animals is. 
In short, I will ask whether we can meaningfully apply the notion of cooperation to the 
relations that human beings have with animals, and if so, under what conditions.  
It is immediately worth specifying that my question is different from asking whether 
there are cooperative interactions among animals. If we have a sufficiently relaxed 
understanding of cooperation, namely not as something dependent on there being 
certain mental states, but as something we can simply observe as the salient outcome of 
a pattern of group interaction, cooperation among animals certainly occurs, as has been 
widely attested by many studies in ethology.3 Rather, I will specifically ask whether and 
under what circumstances we may talk about cooperation between human beings and 
animals. Posing this question raises more difficulties than asking whether and under 
what conditions there can be cooperation among human beings, or among non-human 
animals. In the case of human–animal cooperation, we have to confront the problem that 
the two poles of this possible cooperative relation are deeply different in kind, 
 
2 Significant in this regard is Cynthia Stark’s extension of a cooperation-based approach to dependent and 
disabled individuals. See Stark (2009).  
3 On this understanding, cooperation is not a joint action in which individuals share such mental states as 
beliefs and/or commitments. Rather, it can be defined in two ways, which are not to be thought of as 
mutually exclusive. Cooperation can be defined as a scheme of interaction where individuals of the same 
or different species benefit from the outcome of the coordinated action. See Balcombe (2010: 103-120). 
Cooperation can be also seen as an attitude fostering typical behaviour of ‘generalized reciprocity’, which 
also extends to unfamiliar animals. On this, see Bekoff and Pierce (2009: 55-84).  
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capacities, mental states, language, needs, and so on.4 The idea of cooperation among 
human beings seems to imply that the parties participate voluntarily. This seems to be a 
fundamental precondition. Building on this, standard accounts of cooperation seem to 
entail some further requirements of reciprocity between the parties, and/or that the 
parties are jointly committed to reaching the same goal, and/or that the mental states of 
the cooperating parties are the same, and so on. But this can hardly be the case in 
human–animal relations, because of the diversity of mental capacities, lack of common 
language, and the epistemic impossibility of ascertaining animals’ mental states. How 
are we to check whether animals voluntarily cooperate and do so with similar mental 
states as human beings? Even admitting that animals might have the same mental states 
as human beings, we seem to have an insurmountable epistemic problem in accessing 
them. And, before that, what counts as a marker of voluntary participation? Certainly, 
many animals do have intentions, desires, and volitions that can be counted as forms of 
voluntariness. However, it is not clear how we can presuppose that animals voluntarily 
do something with human beings. On the one hand, we may think that if an animal does 
not opt out of a relation with a human being, that animal voluntarily accepts it. But this 
is too minimal a condition because many animals, in particular domesticated animals, 
may not consider this option even when they find themselves in a non-cooperative 
 
4 To be sure, cooperation in some sense also occurs between animals of very different species with very 
different capacities. But these cases are nevertheless different from human–animal cooperation because 
many of them are likely to be instances of instinctual parasitism or symbiotic relations. Irrespective of 
whether we are willing to consider parasitism a form of cooperation, this is not a useful model for 




relation. On the other hand, to respond to this problem, we might think that we can 
rationally reconstruct situations that might be voluntarily accepted by animals. This can 
be done by reconstructing the typical needs and behaviour of an animal, and by 
checking whether a task required by a possibly cooperative relation is compatible with 
the animal’s needs and behaviour. This ethological reconstruction, however, has very 
little to do with the condition of voluntariness because it is purely deductively 
reconstructed on an objectivist basis. We will see below that this ethological condition, 
properly redefined, has a role in my account without there being any requirement of 
voluntariness.  
All this is to say that in human–animal relations the idea of cooperation should be 
redefined in terms of its basic presuppositions. Epistemic problems regarding access to 
animals’ mental states and the uneasiness of dealing with voluntariness make the usual 
idea of cooperation inapplicable. More generally, if an idea of human-animal 
cooperation is to make sense it must be hospitable to the differences between human 
beings and animals, but still capable of being a notion that bears some resemblance to 
the standard idea of cooperation.  
The paper will proceed as follows. I will start by discussing some prominent proposals, 
outlined by Mark Coeckelbergh, Philip Kitcher, Peter Niesen, and Laura Valentini, that 
apply a cooperative account to human–animal relations (§2). Then, I will ask whether 
these accounts are convincing. Given that the idea of cooperation seems vague, how can 
we distinguish cooperation from what is not cooperation? To assess the applicability of 
the idea of cooperation to animals, I will provide two independent criteria that the idea 
of cooperation with animals should meet: the condition of specificity and of normative 
import (§3). Following them, we will be in a better position to distinguish cooperation 
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from other types of relations. These are interaction (§4), exploitation and use (§5), and 
(individualized) relationships (§6). Building on these distinctions we may come up with 
an idea of cooperation that can be applied to human–animal relations (§7). I will 
conclude with some considerations on the normative implications of this argument (§8).   
 
2. Assessing some accounts of human–animal cooperation  
Let us first consider the proposals by Coeckelbergh (2009), Kitcher (2015), Niesen 
(2014), and Valentini (2014). These theories have the following features in common. 
They all start from a broadly conceived Rawlsian account, where the principles of 
justice are to be to those who entertain a scheme of mutual cooperation. They all appeal 
in some sense to a reciprocity-based and practice-dependent account of justice 
(Sangiovanni 2007). According to them, the application of the principles of justice to 
animals is conditional upon the existence of relations. Hence, these proposals have little 
to say regarding wild animals. They may subscribe to an independent account of 
animals as bearers of subjective interests that obviously applies to wild animals too, but 
their cooperation-based theories do not apply to wild animals. As a consequence, all 
these theories are political in the sense that the treatment of animals is a matter of 
justice, because it concerns what we owe to some individuals in virtue of their 
contribution to society. More specifically, on Niesen (2014)’s view, which focuses on 
labour and farm animals, it is the fact of coercion and submission of animals that 
grounds the need for a fairer application of principles of justice according to the idea of 




Besides these commonalities, these theories differ with regard to the following issues. 
First, they differ as to the width of the extension of cooperation with animals. Kitcher 
(2015)’s and Valentini (2014)’s accounts are somewhat specific insofar as Kitcher 
targets only animals involved in scientific experiments, whereas Valentini focuses only 
on dogs. Niesen, as we have seen, focuses on working animals. We may say that 
Kitcher’s and Niesen’s restrictions are functional and include a number of diverse 
animals, whose commonality is that of being used in the same human enterprise of 
scientific research (Kitcher) or in large social schemes for producing goods (Niesen). 
Valentini, instead, restricts her concern to a species in virtue of its longstanding history 
of domestication. By contrast, Coeckelbergh (2009)’s account has a much wider scope 
and includes all the entities with which human beings entertain continuous interactions 
for the sake of commonly producing some goods.  
It is in virtue of this last feature of Coeckelbergh’s account that we can capture the 
second difference: the normative import of the idea of cooperation. Coeckelbergh’s 
account has, indeed, scarce normative implications per se because it simply entails that 
we owe some consideration to those beings included in cooperative relations.5 However, 
given the variety of entities and differences of relations, what duties of justice follow is 
left indeterminate. This is because in the wider idea of social cooperation Coeckelbergh 
 
5 ‘Humans and non-humans are interdependent in various ways. And on closer inspection, what we call a 
‘social’ scheme (our, human social scheme) is rather a social-artefactual-ecological scheme: … then 
distributive justice, usually applied to ‘social’ justice alone and thus to the ‘merely’ human sphere, should 
also be applied to this complex conglomerate of co-operation we sometimes call the ‘world’ and 
cooperative relations within that world. Then it becomes at least thinkable that we speak, as some do, 
about what we ‘owe’ to nature or to animals,’ Coeckelbergh (2009: 75). 
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includes all the types of entities that contribute to the production of social goods. On 
this line of thought, even forms of artificial intelligence ought to be included. But this is 
troublesome because it is unclear what their moral status is, if any, and thus whether we 
owe anything to these entities. Leaving this issue aside for the moment and focusing on 
animals, at the end of the paper, Coeckelbergh surprisingly introduces a possible 
application of Rawlsian principles of justice into his account. On the one hand, he 
claims that we may apply sufficientarian or more egalitarian principles of justice to 
improve the condition of cooperating animals. On the other hand, even exploitative 
relations are still defined as forms of cooperation to the extent that there is a scheme of 
social production benefiting human beings and there is a situation of mutual 
dependence.6 Hence, his understanding of cooperation begins without a normative 
commitment, which is, however, added at a later stage. But how can we maintain that 
we cooperate with beings if we admit that we are exploiting them? This move is 
possible only to the extent that we employ a non-normative understanding of 
cooperation. But this assumption is troublesome because, if we admit that cooperation is 
a non-normative term, then how can we lament that there are unfair or even exploitative 
forms of cooperation? This option is available to only those that start from some 
position on animals’ moral status, which Coeckelbergh does not because he uses the 
 
6 ‘For instance, if we breed animals for (our, human) consumption and treat them very badly in the course 
of that process, then these cases (1) fall within the scope of problems of justice (as argued above) and (2) 
would warrant the application of a difference principle since increases in the advantages humans get 
from the co-operation (we are clearly highly dependent on them for sustaining our current consumption 
habits) do nothing to maximize the position of these animals, which can be considered the ‘worst-off’, the 
most disadvantaged in human/animal society,’ Coeckelbergh (2009: 82). 
8 
 
idea of cooperation to ascribe moral status. Moreover, this position is liable to the 
following charge: 
If we owe obligations of justice to cows while we are, for example, raising them 
for food, it seems at least somewhat strange to think that we could avoid 
retaining these obligations going forward by ceasing to interact with cows in 
ways that benefit us. (Berkey 2017: 684)   
Valentini’s and Kitcher’s proposals do not fall prey to this normative ambiguity. While 
Valentini explicitly draws on a deontological view of animals’ moral status, Kitcher 
seems less committed to a specific moral account, besides his overall allegiance to 
pragmatism. Kitcher, indeed, seems to think that the fact that we need cooperation for 
the pursuit of valuable goals (such as scientific progress) makes it necessary to find a 
better balance regarding the treatment of animals, either by granting better conditions to 
experimental animals, or by allowing some human individuals to voluntarily chose to 
undergo experiments. Here, the fact that they are employed in a practice (experiments) 
and our commitment to a minimal idea of fairness (understood as a distribution of the 
shares and burdens of cooperation to all) should prompt us to improve the condition of 
experimental animals. However, this argument too easily assumes that experiments on 
animals are legitimate in virtue of the overall good they contribute to producing. True, 
Kitcher engages in some discussion with liberationists by showing that in fact 
experimental animals would not exist without experiments and that they would not be 
capable of surviving outside the lab. Kitcher wants to do without discussing the worth 
of animal life and animal welfare, so as to provide an account of experimentation that is 
as comprehensive and neutral as possible. But it does not tell us that, for instance, some 
kinds of treatment are wrong. It simply demands that the burdens be distributed more 
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fairly.7 However, it contains some sort of ambiguity, because his claims about the 
overall merits of research and the need to redistribute burdens are better accounted for 
by a sort of mild utilitarianism, even though it looks like his account is distant from this 
theory. Indeed, it is only in virtue of the overall gains provided by scientific progress 
that we can justify the individual sacrifice of animals, whose interests, however, are 
here discounted and not equally appreciated, as in other utilitarian accounts.  
This brief discussion of current attempts to include animals within the idea of social 
cooperation has highlighted some shortcomings. Those attempts that want to be 
independent of a specific theory of justice either have scarce and unclear normative 
implications (Coeckelbergh) or implicitly reintroduce a normative set of principles 
(Kitcher). Before discussing what cooperation entails, we should have some criteria for 
establishing which entities should be considered part of cooperation. There is a risk of 
including too many and too different entities, thus diluting the specificity of the notion 
of cooperation and making it indistinguishable from other sorts of relations (see below). 
Valentini eschews these problems by focussing only on dogs and by assuming a 
normative theory of animal interests. But more general accounts should have something 
to say about these problems.  
 
7 ‘It is bad enough that nonhuman animals are recruited to participate in an allegedly cooperative project 
without their consent, but the hollowness of the supposed ‘cooperation’ is revealed by the fact that they 
make the sacrifices and we reap the benefits. That version of the rejoinder overstates. The use of animals 
in experiments has enriched veterinary medicine, as well as its human counterpart. Nevertheless, the 
benefits are primarily enjoyed by human beings and the sacrifices are (with a tiny number of exceptions) 
all on the nonhuman side. Genuine solidarity requires a different balance,’ Kitcher (2015: 305).  
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Finally, all these accounts too easily assume that we can apply the idea of cooperation 
in human-animal relations in the same way as we understand practices of social 
cooperation among humans. The idea of social cooperation as a collective practice of 
interaction in order to produce some goods is taken to be a fact from which normative 
theorizing can start. However, if it is true that social cooperation among human beings 
is an unquestionable fact and the role of a normative theory is to claim for a fairer 
redistribution of the shares and burdens of cooperation, this is not necessarily the case 
for cooperation among human beings and animals. First, as seen, the very idea of 
cooperation might not be applicable because animals lack some capacities that are the 
pre-requisites for a meaningful application of the idea of cooperation. Second, and 
independently of this, some people, namely animal liberationists, hold that this social 
fact of human-animal interaction should not be taken as a given and should rather be 
abolished. For all these reasons, the possibility of human-animal cooperation should be 
discussed both as a conceptual and normative problem.  
Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying that in what follows I will not discuss 
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s proposal (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011). This choice 
might seem strange and unjustified because their approach is political, and recognizes 
the multiple contributions of animals to our societies. However, in their account 
cooperation plays a marginal role. Their proposal to include animals in our societies is 
based on a theory of citizenship and on the fact that animals are domesticated, plus the 
condition of the mutual dependence of (some) animals and human beings. 
Domestication is not the same as cooperation, although there are certainly some areas of 
overlap. First, domestication is a concept that stresses the historical dimension of the 
relation at stake. Moreover, domestication, unlike cooperation, does not focus on the 
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production of a desired outcome, thus including companionship (see below §6). Finally, 
domestication is both a private and a public fact that may simply demand some actions 
and attitudes in one’s private life, while cooperation concerns the demands of justice 
that require an institutional response. To make the difference between domestication 
and cooperation more vivid, consider the flow of the argument of the theories based on 
cooperation:  
- Normative premise. The fact of cooperation triggers duties of justice. 
- Factual premise. Human beings and animals cooperate to produce some 
valuable goods. 
- Normative implication. We ought to apply (some) duties of justice to those 
animals with which we cooperate.  
Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s argument, instead, seems to be the following.  
- First normative premise. Animals have fundamental (moral) rights.  
- Factual premises. Many animals are domesticated and can no longer live in the 
wild. Moreover, domesticated animals and human beings are in many senses 
interdependent and form a communal way of life.  
- Second normative premise. Those individuals with which we have relations of 
interdependence and, thus, are part of our life, should be included as fellow 
citizens in our political communities. 
- Main normative implication. Domesticated animals ought to be included as 
citizens in our societies. 
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- Minor normative implications. The capacity to cooperate of domesticated 
animals ought to be fostered and the norms of interaction should be negotiated 
with them (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 116-122). 
As we can see, the role of cooperation is completely different in Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s argument. Donaldson and Kymlicka also allow some space for animals’ 
cooperation, but it is restricted to those (few) activities that are compatible with 
animals’ nature.8 In their account, cooperation is what is to be justified within the 
rights-based framework, not what justifies the application of the principles of justice to 
animals. The task of clarifying the idea of cooperation and distinguishing it from other 
forms of relations is necessary if cooperation is a foundational notion, while in their 
account, which relation is cooperative is determined by the constraints of rights. Hence, 
there is little need to distinguish cooperation from other forms of relations and tease out 
its normative purchase.  
 
3. Two conditions: Specificity and normative import  
If we want to make sense of the idea that there can be cooperation between human 
beings and animals, we need some criteria to clarify the ambiguity of cooperation. On 
the one hand, cooperation is a very ordinary notion that we employ every day to 
characterize the accomplishment of a common goal, or to make sense of the idea that 
something proceeds smoothly without problems. On the other hand, cooperation also is 
 
8 They only allow those activities that are natural animal activities (production of wool and eggs) and are 
more suspicious about activities that need training (for instance, therapeutic assistance). See Donaldson 
and Kymlicka (2011: 134-144). 
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a term of art, which may occur only under certain conditions. Insofar as we are asking 
whether we can extend it to animals, we have to accommodate the fact that its current 
ordinary use and its technical understanding may pull in opposite directions. In other 
words, in order to apply the idea of cooperation to (possibly some) relations that we 
have with animals, we may have to reformulate or remove some parts of its definition or 
some of its assumptions, regarding for instance the voluntariness of participation, or the 
requirement that the participants have common beliefs and/or awareness of the common 
goal. Such features are hardly applicable to animals.9 However, this reformulation 
should be somewhat consonant with the ordinary use of the term. This is not because of 
a fetishism of the ordinary linguistic use of a term, if any. Rather, it is due to the need to 
explain why we use one term instead of another.  
Hence, I propose to employ the following two conditions in order to test the tenability 
of any formulation of idea of animal cooperation;   
- Specificity: The core of the concept should be clearly distinguished from other 
cognate concepts, despite the possibility of overlap.   
- Normative import: A normative concept, be it broad or restricted, should have 
something to say regarding what we ought or ought not to do, or how we should 
assess a state of affairs. 
 
9 To repeat, I do not say that animals do not have such mental states. On the contrary, at least some higher 
animals are most likely to have them. However, even if we admit this, we cannot ascertain whether the 




These two conditions are hardly controversial, and are applicable to other cases too. At 
first sight, they may seem too banal and incapable of unravelling our problem. And in a 
sense, they are banal. But satisfying these conditions requires that we try to distinguish 
cooperation from other similar and sometimes overlapping notions, and we should bear 
mind that cooperation should retain some clear normative meaning. This is important 
because I take the idea of cooperation to be a normative notion. This assumption needs 
some justification. Indeed, one may object that we can conceive of some cases of 
‘exploitative cooperation’, or ‘harmful cooperation’, where the joint action is 
cooperative but detrimental to one of the parties, and, hence, is to be blamed and 
rectified. How can we conciliate these usages and the normativity of cooperation? If 
these expressions are correct, we cannot say that cooperation is per se a positive notion 
because there can be instances of wrong forms of cooperation. What, then, is the 
normativity of cooperation?  
The only way to make sense of this ambiguity is by saying that cooperation is a notion 
that covers a range of possibly diverse instances that deserve different degrees of 
(positive) appreciation. In this sense, it is a notion that characterizes states of affairs and 
includes descriptive features, but also includes some sort of internal norm. This norm 
indicates that some instances of the notion properly realize its normative sense, while 
others are forms of imperfect expression. This idea may echo the Aristotelian notion of 
the citizen, which not only indicates a set of individuals who are members of the polis 
and have some political entitlements, but also includes an internal norm of behaviour 
and virtues that are appropriate to citizens. Without fully subscribing to an Aristotelian 
teleology, I think this idea nicely captures the nature of notions such as cooperation, 
which are not purely descriptive but also include some internal norm. Indeed, when we 
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say that a certain relation is cooperative, we also tend to introduce some normative 
criterion that discriminates cooperation from what is not cooperation and establishes a 
norm of conduct. If this is correct, we can keep the ordinary usage of wrongful forms of 
cooperation, but still try to disentangle what cooperation properly is and what it 
normatively demands from other relations that do not properly comply with the internal 
norm of cooperation. In this sense, the term ‘exploitative cooperation’ may be accepted 
as indicating an instantiation of a relation that is at least in principle (or in its intention) 
cooperative, but that deviates from its correct realization of the norm internal to the idea 
of cooperation. Obviously enough, not all deviations can still be called cooperative, but 
only those that rest within the range of cooperation. We will see below what the norm of 
cooperation can be and how cooperation can be seen as a range within a normative 
continuum.   
In what follows, in order to reach a possibly satisfying sense of cooperation with 
animals, and in compliance with the two conditions above, I will try to distinguish 
cooperation from other types of relations (interaction, exploitation, use, and 
relationship).  
 
4. Cooperation and interaction 
First of all let us try to put forward a minimal and general definition of cooperation, 
which in virtue of its minimality may be applied to animals and not only to human 
beings.   
Cooperation is a common enterprise of diverse individuals for the sake of 
producing some valuable outcome.  
16 
 
In this preliminary and minimal definition, we can single out the following elements.  
Common enterprise of diverse individuals. As a form of relation, cooperation is 
something that is done together with other individuals. Individuals participating 
in this common action may have radically diverse functions – one party may 
undertake the physical work, another party may simply establish the plan or 
supervise the action. But irrespective of this, cooperation cannot be done alone, 
within occasional and fortuitous relations, or by unconnected individuals.  
Production of a desired outcome. We usually cooperate in order to produce 
something. Hence, cooperation is a purposeful activity. At least some members 
of the common enterprise have the capacity to set goals and implement them by 
using their instrumental rationality.   
This definition seems intuitively correct and applicable to our relations with animals, 
but too minimal. Indeed, it does not specify with which kinds of entities we may 
cooperate, and whether reaching the desired outcome is the only value at stake or 
whether in a cooperative relation we should accept other normative constrains.  
The problem with the first component of this preliminary definition is that it seems 
correct but over-inclusive. Indeed, here the kinds of entities that can take part in the 
common enterprise are not specified. Accordingly, this means that we may also have 
cooperative relations with inanimate things, technological devices, robots, and so on. 
There’s a general question of whether advanced forms of artificial intelligence may be 
attributed some moral status, to the extent that they have high computational levels and 
possibly some form of agency. This is a possibility that I do not want to deny, although 
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I’m intuitively a bit sceptical about it.10 But, even if we grant that some forms of 
artificial intelligence have some kind of agency, there are other two reasons for rejecting 
this position. First, in order for an entity to be capable of cooperating perhaps we need 
to set the condition that such an entity might in principle do otherwise. I suggest this 
condition in order to make sense of the idea that cooperation is, even in a minimal 
sense, a common action, not simply an individual action performed through the use of 
tools. This means that I do not cooperate with my computer even if the computer has 
high levels of computational capacities, because the computer cannot refuse to operate 
with my (formally correct) orders. In a commonsensical manner, I may say that today 
my computer is not cooperative, meaning that it does not respond to my inputs. But that 
simply means that there is something blocking my inputs or that my inputs are incorrect.  
These considerations point to a further question. Can we cooperate with an entity that 
has been created to be at our complete disposal and that we can use in whatever way we 
please?  This seems improper because, even in a minimal sense, cooperation must be a 
normative notion, thus entailing that the cooperative relation does not cause structural 
and significant harm. Otherwise we do not cooperate but exploit (see the next section). 
But before ascertaining whether there is a significant harm we must check whether it 
makes sense to pose this question in general. In other words, the entity with which we 
have a relation must be capable of being harmed. And this means that it must have a 
good of its own. More generally, the question is: can a computer as an individual entity 
be harmed? I doubt that it can. A computer may be damaged or destroyed but not 
 
10 Floridi and Sanders (2004) have proposed a reformulation of the notion of agency in order to include 
some forms of artificial entities such as computing systems. For a sceptical position denying that 
computer systems can be moral agents, although they are certainly moral entities, see Johnson (2006). 
18 
 
harmed because computers don’t have a good of their own. What features determine the 
capacity for being harmed is a controversial and complicated question.11 But the 
following considerations should be sufficient for the specific needs of my argument. 
First, computers don’t have mental states. Second, computers are not sentient entities. 
Thus, they do not have a wide array of capacities to experience positive or negative 
states of affairs as good or bad for themselves. Moreover, computers don’t share with 
other sentient beings the most typical harm that human beings share with non-human 
animals – i.e. the harm of suffering. Third, computers can be replicated in a way that 
genetically engineered animals cannot. If we agree that computers can be replicated, it 
follows that it is permissible to replace them – that is, that they can be destroyed and 
replaced with equivalent items. This fact marks a difference with respect to animals. In 
a slogan, even if computers can be moral agents in virtue of their computational 
capacity, they can’t be moral patients because of their lack of sentience.  
Against the possible implication that computers are morally inert, one may object that a 
computer is not a tool like a knife because we do something with and not only through 
the computer. That seems correct. And, to characterize the kinds of things that we do 
with computers, I’d rather say that we interact, rather than cooperate, that is, we have 
sustained and complicated forms of continuous relations, with entities that operate 
according to our instructions but cannot be harmed. In sum, the implication of these 
considerations is that we ought to reject Coeckelbergh’s application of the idea of 
 
11 Bernstein (1998) has argued that being morally considerable means being at least a moral patient. To be 
a moral patient an entity must have the capacity to have (subjective) experiences, which animals have and 




cooperation to inanimate objects with which we may have forms of interaction for the 
sake of producing some goal.  
 
5. Cooperation, exploitation and use 
Now we can better specify the normative import of these considerations. To cooperate, 
is it sufficient to have a sustained relation with individuals that are capable of having a 
good of their own for the sake of producing some good? No, this is not sufficient 
because first we have to check whether such a relation may significantly disadvantage 
one of the parties. If the action to produce a common good is structurally detrimental to 
the welfare of one of the parties, we could hardly say that the parties are cooperating 
because we have assumed the normative character of cooperation. As anticipated, the 
case of exploitative cooperation is to be seen as a deviation from an internal norm. 
Instead, if a relation is structurally detrimental to one of the parties, I think it would be 
more appropriate to talk about exploitation.  
For instance, we would hardly say that slaves in the old American tobacco plantations 
cooperated with their owners to produce tobacco because they had been compelled to 
work and they were deeply harmed. Hence, they were capable of having a good of their 
own (unlike machines or computers), but were treated merely as machines for the sake 
of producing tobacco irrespective of their interests and will. 
But what do I mean here by exploitation of animals? I mean simply that I use the 
individual with which I pursue the desired goal in a purely instrumental way without 
taking into account its welfare at all. Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying that here I 
understand welfare in a very broad sense as a notion encompassing all subjective 
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experiences, thus including suffering, pain, distress, boredom, pleasure, joy, etc. In this 
sense, welfare is the collection of all conscious experiences. In animal ethics and animal 
management, welfare is sometimes understood as a set of objective criteria regarding 
health, living conditions, nourishment etc. I do not want to deny that these criteria are 
correct. However, here I understand these criteria as a sort of a proxy for approaching 
what counts, namely conscious states.  
In the literature on human exploitation, the moral requirements for avoiding exploitation 
are usually demanding. A non-exploitative relation is fair, and/or does not harm, and/or 
does not violate human dignity, and/or does not entail domination, and so on (Zwolinski 
and Wertheimer 2012). Moreover, working without having decent alternative 
opportunities does not meet the condition of non-exploitation either. However, these 
characterizations are, I think, inapplicable to animals. Some sort of human domination 
seems inevitable because domesticated animals depend on human beings. Moreover, 
animals do not have human dignity. And, against Kitcher’s optimistic take, what 
fairness with animals demands is unclear. If fairness is not applied to individuals with 
equal moral status (namely animals and human beings), it might be realized by granting 
only survival and basic needs. Finally, it is difficult to establish the other available 
options for an animal. True, wild animals held in captivity may seem to have an option, 
namely that of going back to their natural condition. In this sense, the alternative to 
exploitation is liberation, but not cooperation.  
Hence, in the case of animals failing the criteria of voluntariness, dignity, and other 
typical human conditions, we need criteria to define a type of relation, which I call 
exploitation, that represent the range of worst types of human-animal relations. In cases 
of exploitation, I submit, animals are instrumentally employed for the sake of producing 
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something without taking their interests into account. Like cooperation, exploitation is a 
scalar notion that admits of degrees with regard to how much animals are 
instrumentalised and their welfare disregarded.   
Should we conclude that by instrumentalising animals we do not exploit them, because 
we cannot apply this concept to animals? Or should we say that by instrumentalising 
animals we always exploit them? This conclusion seems rushed because it leaves out 
the possibility that there might be relations that are partially instrumental but not 
detrimental to the well-being of animals that could be called cooperation. Such relations 
are those where human beings and animals have a relation for the sake of producing a 
good through a common action (with different tasks), where not only human beings 
benefit from these actions, and the well-being of animals is positively affected.  
Now the following question arises: if in exploitation animals (and sometimes human 
beings) are merely treated as instruments that are at the disposal of the more powerful 
party, do we exploit an animal whenever we have an instrumental relation with it? I 
would resist this implication because cooperation is also a form of instrumental 
enterprise for the sake of reaching some goal. But cooperation is not the only form of 
non-exploitative instrumental relation, and should be distinguished from other forms of 
instrumental relation in virtue of the specific type of admissible actions.  
To appreciate this difference, consider the further conceptual distinction between 
cooperation and use. I am aware that the idea of use might be misleading insofar as it 
also denotes the general notion of all instrumental relations, including both exploitation 
and cooperation. However, I think we need a neutral and intermediate notion between 
the two extremes, and I cannot see any other alternative. Therefore, let me be a bit 
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stipulative about its function in this context. This distinction is, I think, necessary in 
order to posit the notion of some intermediate level between exploitation and 
cooperation. If we put these two terms on a continuum from the negative (exploitation) 
to the positive (cooperation), we can find intermediate levels that could be measured in 
terms of whether and how much the relation causes harm to the welfare of the animal, 
or on the contrary benefits it. Building on this, we can add the related question of 
whether the relation is compatible with the natural ethological features of the animal. 
The more a relation is in conformity with the natural specificity of an animal, the less it 
is likely to harm it, and the more it is likely to benefit it. In the light of this, we can ask 
whether there is an intermediate term between cooperation and exploitation. I think 
there is such a term, and it is the idea of use. This is not an unnecessary sophistication 
because if there were not an intermediate term we would have to establish a point, a 
threshold after which exploitation becomes cooperation, and vice versa. But that is 
controversial and counterintuitive given the radically different moral import of the two 
notions. By positing the idea of use, instead, we can map the intermediate area between 
the two terms. Furthermore, the notion of use, in general, is a non-normative notion, 
which can have positive, negative, or neutral senses depending on further specifications 
or on the context. Hence, here I understand use as a form of relation where animals are 
employed to obtain a certain goal, which is different from exploitation because the 
instrumentalization of the animal does not lead to a total disregard of the animal’s 
welfare. In the light of this, the difference between use and cooperation is scalar, not 
qualitative. Cooperation, therefore, is a kind of non-exploitative instrumental relation 
where the welfare of animals is taken care of and the kinds of tasks required of them are 




6. Cooperation and relationships  
Building on this we may think that all forms of relations where the welfare of the 
animal is taken care of are forms of cooperation. But I think this supposition is over-
hasty, because we have yet to distinguish cooperation from another type of relation. To 
see what I mean we may ask whether I cooperate with my cat. I would resist accepting 
this statement. Indeed, I may have a meaningful and respectful relation with my cat, and 
maybe such a relation also entails some form of reciprocity. But I don’t think I 
cooperate with my cat. We may live together more or less peacefully, and we may have 
a meaningful relation. But there’s something missing in it in order to make it a form of 
cooperation. What is missing is the dimension of producing some desired good. If we 
think that entertaining an affective relationship entails the production of a good, we may 
think that, to the extent that the cat enjoys staying with me more or less as I do, we 
cooperate in some sense. But I’d be sceptical about this conclusion because I am not 
sure I would be ready to apply it to relations among humans too. Does it make sense to 
say that I cooperate with my wife insofar as we keep each other company? Maybe we 
can say so. But I think it makes more sense to say that we cooperate to the extent that 
we do something together for the sake of producing an outcome that is external to the 
act of doing something together. For instance, we cooperate in order to keep the house 
clean, take care of our daughter, and so on. But having a good relationship as a couple is 
not per se cooperation. We just do many things together and have appropriate attitudes 
insofar as we have a relation and for the sake of keeping it alive. Being in this kind of 
relations entails the production of some good that is internal to the relation; or better 
still the successful continuation of the relation is the good itself. Instrumental rationality 
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may play a role in this kind of relation too, but the purpose of acting is intrinsic to the 
relation itself, not instrumental for the sake of bringing about some external good.    
In order to characterize this idea, we may employ the notion of participatory goods. A 
participatory good is a special kind of good in which the act of participation, the 
production of the good, and the enjoyment of the good are all the same action, seen 
from different angles.  
It is not merely that the production of a participatory good (bringing it into existence or 
sustaining it in existence) requires more than one individual to participate in a certain 
kind of activity – although that is certainly true. Rather, a participatory good just is the 
activity in which those individuals participate. The activity of producing a participatory 
good also constitutes the participatory good. (Morauta, 2002: 94-5, emphasis in 
original) 
Examples of these kinds of goods are the goods of speaking a language, having a party, 
praying in common, and, I submit, enjoying a relation with a pet, too. The relation of 
companionship with an animal, typically a pet, entails a participatory good because the 
parties to this relation for most of the part do not reproduce anything else than the 
relation itself. No further external good should be produced in order to sustain a 
meaningful relation.  
Hence, I call these kinds of relations, involving participatory goods, (individualized) 
relationships, to characterize the non-instrumental nature of the relation and its 
idiosyncratic feature, which makes all individualized relationships different from other 
types of relations, and each of them different from other relationships too. Moreover, 
unlike in other cases of cooperation, the parties to a relationship are not (easily) 
replaceable, while in a relation of cooperation they are. If I substitute my cat with 
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another cat I (possibly) create another relationship, and do not continue the same one, 
while if I substitute a laying hen with another similar hen, I continue the same form of 
cooperation with a different individual. 
This does not exclude the possibility that we develop individualized relationships with 
cooperating animals. One may ask whether my dog does not cooperate with me. I think 
we may still say that our companion animals cooperate with us to the extent that they 
also help us in other ways besides being a companion animal. This could be the case, 
for instance, with a dog acting as a guard dog. In this sense, there can be multiple 
relations that add to each other. One may be not convinced yet, and still think that the 
relation of companionship is cooperative because it brings about positive effects to 
humans (and animals too). In this case, we add a type of relation (relationship) to an 
underlying level of cooperation, without substituting it. Companionship should be 
thought of as a proper form of social cooperation when it is the only support for the 
elderly, people living alone, or those who are depressed. In this sense, pets perform a 
sort of continuous activity that substitutes caring services. In reply, I admit that this is 
true in many cases. However, if we are ready to consider animal companionship a 
substitute for professional services of care, we should also be willing to consider 
relationships among humans as having this value. Of course, in many cases they have 
this value, but it would certainly be reductive and sometimes inappropriate to identify 
the proper value of human sentimental, affective, and family relationships by the 
criterion of how far they substitute for professional care services that benefit mental and 
physical health. Hence, relationships for companionship are to be distinguished from 
relations of cooperation, although they also produce some benefit, because their purpose 




7. Summary of the argument and examples   
To recap what we have been saying so far, for there to be cooperation between animals 
and human beings there must be:  
1. some form of relation (thus excluding wild animals), 
2. which should be continuous (thus excluding occasional relations with those that 
Donaldson and Kymlicka call ‘liminal animals’), 
3. between entities that have the capacity to be positively or negatively affected in 
terms of their welfare by that relation (thus excluding interactions between 
human beings and non-living intelligent entities), and 
4. not detrimental to the good of the animal (thus distinguishing cooperation from 
exploitation), 
5. whose purpose should be the production of an external good, not the pure 
continuation of the relation itself (thus distinguishing cooperation and use from 
relationships with companion animals). 
Now we may offer a revised definition.  
Cooperation between human beings and animals is a non-occasional form of 
relation for the sake of producing an external good that does not harm the animal 
but rather benefits it. Hence, it is a kind of relation where the animal’s natural 
capacities are instrumentally employed, but within the boundaries of the animal’s 
ethological features.  
This definition of cooperation has normative purchase in that it distinguishes relations 
on the basis of their being favourable or detrimental to an animal’s well-being and 
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ethological features. But it is rather abstract because it is invariant as to other features. 
For instance, it is compatible both with forms of close cooperation where all 
participants know each other, and with impersonal forms of cooperation characterized 
by anonymity.  
Let me summarize what we have been saying so far with the following table featuring 
the main forms of possible relations with animals, the purpose of the relation, and its 
normative assessment. As anticipated, these categories map a scalar reality and the 
boundaries between them are fuzzy. 
Table 1. Types of human-animal relations and their normative assessment 
Type of relation  Purpose  Normative character 
Exploitation  Purely instrumental  Total disregard of animal’s 
welfare and natural 
features  
Use  Instrumental Partial concern for 
animal’s welfare and 
natural features 
Cooperation Instrumental but 
compatible with animal’s 
nature 
Concern for animal’s 
welfare and natural 
features  
Individualized relationship Intrinsic (no production of 
a good outside the 
relationship itself) 
Full concern for animal’s 
welfare and natural 
features 
 




In practice, what kind of relations would be cooperative ones? The possibility of there 
being cooperative relations in practice that are respectful of these conditions also 
depends on the moral account used to establish what the well-being of an animal 
consists in. I cannot outline this account here. In what follows I will simply provide 
some possible examples, which should be taken with a pinch of salt because I am not 
committed to saying that they are fully justified and correct. 
A clear case of exploitation is represented by industrial farming. Here the minimal 
needs of animals are totally disregarded in every sense. Although one may say that such 
animals are better off insofar as they have been created rather than not created, still such 
a condition of minimal existence is hardly satisfying for any account of animal welfare.  
Examples of use may be, perhaps, those experiments that apply the three-Rs principle 
(reduce, replace, and refine) and some (e.g. free range) animal farming for meat 
production. These cases are not totally exploitative insofar as some concern for the 
animals’ welfare is at place. However, in order to establish which labs and farms 
represent cases of use and not of exploitation (or of cooperation!) we would need, again, 
a substantive account of animal welfare.  
Building on these distinctions, examples of cooperation may be no-kill farms,12 guide 
dogs for blind people, some forms of animal therapy. These examples are admittedly a 
 
12 This is so if we assume that in our preferred substantive theory of animal welfare cooperation demands 
not disposing of animals’ life. However, if one rejects this assumption, one may also argue that animals 
do not have an inherent interest in living and that, therefore, free range and pasturing methods of rearing 
animals for meat production are legitimate forms of cooperation.  
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bit vague and are only meant to given an idea. But insofar as we don’t have a 
substantive theory of animal well-being, this should sketch the idea of a common action 
where an animal’s needs are taken care of and the activity itself is not at odds with the 
animal’s ethology.13  
Finally, examples of (individualized) relationships are those where companion animals 
are involved. Obviously, here we are considering only positive cases where the species 
and individual needs are well taken care of. No doubt there are cases in practice where 
this is not so. 
In sum, if there is some space for cooperation between human beings and animals this 
space is a small one on the boundary between use and relationships. On the one hand, 
cooperation may be barely distinguishable from some forms of use compatible with 
animals’ well-being; on the other hand, in some forms of cooperation animals and 
human beings are very likely to develop individualized relationships. Still, despite these 
overlaps and fuzzy contours I think it makes sense to distinguish these concepts.  
As a general objection, one may point out that the criteria for distinguishing cooperation 
from other relations are at odds with the standard understanding of cooperation among 
human beings. Indeed, in cooperation among human beings, we hardly consider welfare 
to be the most distinctive criterion. To the extent that people voluntarily enter a relation, 
they may encounter risky and harmful situations but still cooperate because they have 
 
13 A substantive account has been provided by Cochrane (2016). Cochrane claims, among other things, 
that some uses of animals (guard dogs, pet therapy, races, police dogs, etc.) can be made compatible with 
a non-harming conception of cooperation, if animals are appropriately trained and treated as labourers 
with their own labour rights.  
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consented to doing so. As an example, consider missionary groups or discovery 
enterprises. These are risky and possibly harmful forms of cooperation. This might be a 
problem for my commitment to make the idea of animal cooperation somewhat 
compatible with ordinary uses of the term. However, as we have seen, the condition of 
voluntariness is almost inapplicable to animals. We can hardly ask them whether they 
consent to do something, and the mere fact that they do not escape is not sufficient to 
suggest voluntariness – in particular for domesticated animals, which have developed 
some sort of hard-wired adaptive preferences. Hence, failing the possibility of applying 
the subjective criterion of voluntariness, we cannot but apply the objective criterion 
based on what we presumptively know about animals’ welfare and ethology.  
 
8. Conclusion: What normative import?  
From this analysis, it follows that in order to have a conceptually specific and 
normatively significant idea of cooperation with animals, we need a substantive account 
of what the main interests of animals are. Typically, such an account would primarily, 
but not necessarily only, concern their welfare.14 One may be suspicious about this and 
ask what the point of outlining a treatment of animals based on the idea of cooperation 
is, given that in the end we need a further normative step. If we were to agree on a 
substantive conception of animal interests, the objection goes, we would have a set of 
 
14 In this final section, I focus only on interests based on welfare without presupposing that animals have 
only these types of interests. This is not a quirky restriction. Rather, my point is simply that whatever the 
diverse substantive account, there is wide agreement on the idea that animals have at least some interests 
regarding their welfare (e.g. not to suffer, to have pleasant experiences, and so on).  
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duties regarding animals without the need to plug in the idea that duties arise from 
cooperation. In reply to this, we may say that this worry is misplaced because this is a 
problem only for those theories (Coeckelbergh’s, and to some extent Kitcher’s too) that 
seem to do without an explicit substantive account of animals’ interests. In other words, 
it is a problem for those theories committed to saying that we have duties of justice 
towards animals in virtue of the fact of cooperation even though we do not have other 
normative commitments. But this is not a problem for other human–animal cooperation 
theories, to the extent that the idea of cooperation does not do all the fundamental 
normative work but, rather, only specifies the duties of justice that we owe to those with 
whom we cooperate.  
In closing, we may start to sketch the normative contours of a theory of cooperation 
with animals. As I cannot here outline a substantive theory of animals’ interests, I will 
limit myself to a few further considerations.  
First, one may ask whether the idea of cooperation entails the requirement that animals 
have an interest in liberty. Indeed, one may argue that if animals had no interest in 
liberty, they could not entertain cooperative relations, but only forms of use. However, I 
have not characterized cooperation in these terms. The difference between use and 
cooperation is a matter of degree of concern for animals’ welfare. Hence, my account is 
compatible both with those who think that animals have an interest in liberty 
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011), and those who reject this claim (Cochrane 2012). But 
it stands in contrast with those (liberationists) who think that any kind of relation 




Second, if, for there to be cooperation, the welfare of the animal is to be taken care of, it 
follows that imposing tasks on animals that are at odds with their nature is not 
compatible with cooperation. But what about genetically engineered animals that are 
programmed and created with features amenable to specific purposes (now typically 
those of undergoing specific lab tests)? As genetic engineering is a radical form of 
instrumental approach, it might seem to stand in contrast to the spirit of cooperation. 
However, if genetic engineering is devised in order to make animals more suited to 
performing a specific task or to make them not suffer (or suffer less), perhaps genetic 
engineering is compatible with the spirit of cooperation. However, I leave this question 
open and conditional upon an account of animals’ moral status establishing that there is 
no right to genetic integrity.  
Finally, we can ask: what are the normative implications triggered by cooperation, in 
my account? If cooperation does not do all the normative work – for there should be a 
preliminary theory of moral status and a substantive account – what is left to 
cooperation? This worry is strengthened by the fact that a substantive account may be 
sufficient to rule out exploitation as unacceptable, without making appeal to the content 
of cooperation, because exploitation is a direct neglect of animals’ interests. In this case, 
cooperation would still have a role because the substantive account of animals’ interests 
might simply establish prohibitions (for instance, to inflict significant suffering) without 
outlining further duties or opportunities for animals. If so, the role of cooperation may 
be that of outlining a set of duties to distribute to animals fairer shares of the output of 
social cooperation (Kitcher 2015; Niesen 2014). Furthermore, cooperation might justify 
the animals’ rights to retire and receive a pension after many years of service, or special 
33 
 
entitlements that do not necessarily concern animals’ interest in welfare.15 In sum, 
whether the normative work of cooperation is wide-ranging or limited depends on the 
substantial account specifying animals’ moral status. If such an account is minimal, the 
role of cooperation can be wide; if it is larger and more robust, the role of cooperation is 
diminished, but still not void or negligible.   
Although these considerations do not touch all the issues at stake, they offer a glance at 
the possible development of a theory of human–animal cooperation that is compatible 
with the framework proposed here.  
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